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Abstract 
In October 2008, euro-area countries adopted a joint framework to guide national policies 
combatting the effects of the global financial crisis. In Austria, this led to the enactment of a 
number of measures and amendments, including the Interbank Market Support Act 
(Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, or IBSG). IBSG called for the establishment of a new 
clearing bank to facilitate interbank lending. It also permitted the Minister of Finance to 
guarantee up to €5 billion of short-term securities issued by the clearing bank and to absorb 
losses of the clearing bank up to €4 billion. The clearing bank, Oesterreichische Clearingbank 
AG (OeCAG), was owned and capitalized by Austrian banks and was open to participation 
from all credit institutions and insurance companies. Through regular auctions, OeCAG 
matched available funds to demands for credit for fixed terms. Over the lifespan of the bank, 
310 auctions were conducted in euros and dollars, allotting €22.5 billion and $1.5 billion 
respectively. After being extended by one year, the guarantee scheme authorized by IBSG 
expired on December 31, 2010, and OeCAG closed shortly thereafter. None of the 
government guarantees were triggered. 
Keywords: credit guarantee, clearing bank, Austria
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs.  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 







At a Glance  
Following the declaration of a joint action 
plan for European Union member states in 
October 2008, Austria enacted a number of 
measures in response to the global 
financial crisis. Included in this framework 
was the Interbank Market Support Act 
(Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, or IBSG), 
which targeted disruption in the interbank 
market. Under IBSG, the Austrian 
government called for the establishment of 
a clearing bank that would borrow and lend 
funds on the interbank market. The 
clearing bank would be owned by Austrian 
financial institutions.  
Accordingly, Austrian credit institutions 
established Oesterreichische Clearingbank 
AG (OeCAG) with €180 million of equity 
capital raised by the banks. Under IBSG, the 
government pledged to cover a maximum 
of €4 billion in OeCAG losses, should loan 
defaults by the clearing bank’s borrowers 
result in its regulatory capital falling below 
legally required levels. In addition, OeCAG 
was permitted to seek government 
guarantees on its newly issued securities, 
provided they had a maturity of one year or 
less. This guarantee was capped at €5 
billion. 
OeCAG was required to charge market-based fees and interest rates and was subject to a 50-
basis-point fee charged for government guarantees.  
OeCAG conducted regular auctions to match available deposits with demands for credit. Over 
the lifespan of the bank, 310 auctions were conducted in euros and dollars, allotting €22.5 
billion and $1.5 billion respectively. Following a one-year extension, IBSG expired on 
December 31, 2010, and OeCAG closed shortly thereafter. None of the government 
guarantees were triggered. 
Summary Evaluation 
Evaluations of OeCAG point to declines in liquidity risk as evidence that OeCAG was 
successful in reinvigorating the interbank market. However, OeCAG alone was not able to 
restore the Austrian interbank market to its pre-crisis state. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose:   To strengthen the interbank lending 
market by establishing a privately-owned clearing 
bank with a government guarantee to meet credit 
demand 
Announcement Date   October 27, 2008 
Operational Date October 27, 2008 





Originally December 31, 
2009; later extended to 
December 31, 2010  
Program Size €4 billion for loan losses;  
€5 billion for guarantees of 
short-term securities 
Usage  310 auctions conducted, 
allotting €22.5 billion and 
$1.5 billion. No guarantees 
were triggered 
Outcomes No defaults 
Notable Features Guaranteed debt issued by 
clearing bank 
Austria: Oesterreichische Clearingbank AG 
(OeCAG) 
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Interbank Market Support Act (IBSG Guarantee Program):  Austria Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$389.5 billion in 2007  




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$46,856 in 2007 
$51,709 in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year 
senior debt)  












Size of banking system  
$400.4 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
102.8% in 2007 




Size of banking system as a 
percentage of financial system  
Banking system assets equal to 100% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 100% of 
financial system in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
84.1% of total banking assets in 2007 
81.7% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
26% of total banking assets in 2007 
28% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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Government ownership of banking 
system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2007 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% (90% for non-individuals) insurance on 
deposits up to $22,727.00 in 2007 
100% (90% for non-individuals) insurance on 
deposits up to $22,727.00 in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset  
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Problems in the European interbank market were exacerbated by the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 66). A number of unique 
conditions in Austria caused further disruptions to interbank lending. In response, the 
Austrian government passed a package of measures related to financial stability. This 
package included the Interbank Market Support Act (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz, or 
IBSG), which established a State-guaranteed clearing bank and a guarantee scheme for 
securities issued by other credit institutions, and the Financial Market Stability Act 
(Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz, or FinStaG), which permitted state guarantees for individual 
institutions as part of a recapitalization process (Republic of Austria 2008). The package was 
approved by the European Commission (EC) under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which 
permits State aid that remedies a serious disturbance in a member state’s economy 
(European Commission n.d.). (See Appendix A for more information on the unique 
conditions in Austria and specific programs adopted in response.) 
Program Description 
Under IBSG, the scheme allowed the Minister of Finance to guarantee bonds issued by credit 
institutions and insurance companies with a maximum allowance of €75 billion. Of the €75 
billion, €4 billion was explicitly earmarked for absorbing the losses of a new clearing bank 
specifically established to stimulate the interbank market (Republic of Austria 2008). IBSG 
stipulated that this new bank would be privately owned by credit institutions or insurance 
companies. Accordingly, the major Austrian banks established the Oesterreichische 
Clearingbank AG (OeCAG) and funded it with €180 million in equity. OeCAG’s operations 
were managed by the Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB), which was also owned by 
the major Austrian banks. OeCAG was open to all credit institutions and insurance 
companies. It received deposits from banks and insurance companies and could also issue 
securities to fund itself (potentially with a government guarantee). OeCAG then matched 
these funds with demands for credit from banks and insurance companies through regular 
auctions. Its business volume was capped at €10 billion (Kalss 2010, 530).   
According to IBSG, the government was authorized to provide two different types of 
guarantees to the clearing bank. The government would absorb losses of up to €4 billion 
incurred by OeCAG on funds it lent to borrowing banks and insurance companies. This 
guarantee would be triggered if a loan default caused OeCAG’s regulatory capital to fall below 
legally required levels, in which case the government would provide enough equity capital 
to restore the clearing bank’s regulatory capital to the required minimum amount. In 
addition, the government could provide guarantees for securities issued by OeCAG to fund 
itself. The government was authorized to guarantee up to €5 billion of OeCAG securities with 
a maturity of one year or less. Like all other credit institutions and insurance companies 
eligible for state guarantees under IBSG, OeCAG was subject to an additional guarantor fee 
of 50 basis points (bps) for the assumption of liability by the government (Schmitz, Weber, 
and Posch 2009, 67). 
Outcomes 
OeCAG was allowed to close at the end of February 2011 following the expiration of IBSG at 
the end of 2010. According to the Federal Ministry of Finance, OeCAG “conducted 310 
auctions, comprising allotments of €22.5 billion and $1.5 billion,” and no government 
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guarantees were triggered (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.). OeCAG was particularly useful 
for small banks with limited access to euro money markets and the ECB’s open market 
operations (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 69).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. OeCAG was part of a broader package of measures adopted in response to the 
financial crisis. 
OeCAG was authorized by the Interbank Market Support Act (IBSG), which was passed 
alongside the Financial Market Stability Act (FinStaG) as part of the Austrian Financial 
Market Stability Package. This package of measures was introduced in response to the joint 
call from euro-area countries for national legislation aimed at restoring financial market 
stability (Austrian Financial Market Stability Package). FinStaG’s primary authority involved 
strengthening the capital base of individual credit institutions, including outright capital 
injections, the acquisition of existing shares, and even the ability to obtain ownership rights 
of institutions in “exceptional cases”.  
2. The Interbank Market Support Act provided the legal basis for the Minister of 
Finance to provide guarantees to and on behalf of a newly established clearing 
bank. 
The IBSG, which was established to strengthen the interbank market, allowed the Federal 
Minister of Finance to assume liability for “a company established for the exclusive purpose 
of borrowing funds from credit institutions or insurance companies via the interbank market 
in its own name and for its own account and loaning these funds to other credit institutions 
or insurance companies via the interbank market in its own name and for its own account.” 
As part of this liability, the Minister of Finance was authorized to provide guarantees for 
short-term securities issued as part of these transactions (Republic of Austria 2008).  
3. European Commission approval was required for the implementation of the 
clearing bank and guarantees. 
On October 31 2008, a little less than a week after IBSG was enacted, Austria notified the 
European Commission (EC) of its passage. In a letter dated December 9, 2008 the EC notified 
the Austrian government that though the guarantees under IBSG constituted state aid under 
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, they were permitted under Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty 
(Global Trade Alert 2008). Article 87(3)(b) permits state aid “to promote the execution of an 
important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State” (European Commission n.d.). This decision was consistent with 
an earlier communication published by the EC, which stated that Article 87(3)(b) could be 
used as a legal basis for aid measures like general schemes to address the financial crisis 
(European Commission 2008).  
4. The total amount of guaranteed securities that OeCAG could issue was capped at 
€5 billion.  
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OeCAG obtained the funds used to make loans to borrowing banks and insurance companies 
by taking deposits via auctions and issuing short-term securities. When issuing short-term 
securities, the clearing bank could elect for the government to assume liability as a guarantor 
in an amount capped at €5 billion (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 67). In addition, as part 
of its €75 billion budget for guarantees under IBSG, the Austrian government specifically 
earmarked €4 billion for absorbing the losses of OeCAG on loans it made to borrowing banks 
and insurance companies. This guarantee was triggered if a loan default caused OeCAG’s 
regulatory capital to fall below legally required levels, in which case the government would 
provide enough equity capital to restore the clearing bank’s regulatory capital to the 
required minimum amount.   
Though the IBSG budget was reduced over the life of the finance facility, the reductions did 
not appear to affect the amount pledged to cover OeCAG loan defaults (Federal Ministry of 
Finance n.d.). 
5. OeCAG could issue guaranteed securities, the proceeds of which it could then lend 
to any Austrian credit institutions and insurance companies. 
IBSG stipulated that ownership of the clearing bank “shall be limited to credit institutions, 
insurance companies or the statutory bodies set up on the professional associations level for 
the representation of their interest” (Republic of Austria 2008). In accordance with this 
stipulation, Austrian banks established OeCAG. The clearing bank was funded by €180 
million of contributions from the private sector, and its operations were managed by the 
Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB), the longstanding central securities depository for 
Austrian institutions, which was also owned by the banks. Although the government did 
serve as a guarantor, the equity capital funded by the banks was meant to buffer initial loan 
losses. This in turn could “reduce the potential moral hazard at the expense of the Federal 
government and the taxpayers” (Kalss 2010, 531). 
OeCAG conducted regular auctions at which both sides of the market submitted price and 
quantity bids. Demands for credit for fixed terms, usually three months and six months, were 
met only if there was a corresponding offer from the deposit side; the bank did not perform 
any maturity transformation (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 67). IBSG required the 
clearing bank to “provide its services for a fee and at a lending interest rate, which [would] 
be in conformity with market conditions” (Republic of Austria 2008).  
IBSG stipulated that the clearing bank would borrow funds from credit institutions or 
insurance companies and loan them in turn to other credit institutions or insurance 
companies (Republic of Austria).  
6. Debt securities issued by OeCAG were eligible for the guarantee. 
The proceeds from the guaranteed debt issuances would then be lent to eligible institutions. 
7. There was a one-year maturity cap for eligible securities issued by OeCAG. 
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Securities issued by OeCAG had to have a maturity of one year or less in order to be eligible 
for the government guarantee (Posch et al 67). The government does not appear to have 
established minimum maturity requirements for eligible debt. 
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible. 
Program documents contained no language restricting eligible currencies, and OeCAG 
appears to have conducted auctions in euros and dollars. 
9. There does not appear to have been a per-institution cap on borrowing by the 
banks and insurance companies eligible to borrow from OeCAG. 
Program documents contained no language restricting the amount that an individual 
institution could borrow from OeCAG.  
10. The government charged a 50-basis-point guarantor fee for participation. 
Under IBSG, all credit institutions and insurance companies owed the government a fee for 
its assumption of liability. IBSG explicitly stated that this fee also applied to the clearing bank 
(Republic of Austria 2008). Austria’s approach to fees followed guidance issued by the 
European Central Bank in “Recommendations on Government Guarantees on Bank Debt” on 
October 20, 2008. In practice, because the guaranteed securities issued by the OeCAG had to 
have maturities of one year or less, the flat 50 bps fee was consistent with the ECB’s guidance 
(Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 67). 
11. There do not appear to have been any further conditions for participation. 
Program documents contained no discussion of further conditions for borrowing from 
OeCAG. 
12. OeCAG was allowed to close at the end of February 2011 following the expiration 
of IBSG at the end of 2010.  
The guarantee scheme under IBSG expired on December 31, 2010, at which point no new 
guarantees could be issued by the government. The scheme was extended by a year from its 
original expiration date of December 31, 2009 (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.). 
III. Evaluation 
Assessments of the IBSG and the OeCAG by Austria’s central bank and scholars point to a 
decline in liquidity risk among Austrian banks as evidence that the OeCAG helped 
reinvigorate the interbank market (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009; Kalss 2010). Schmitz, 
Weber, and Posch (2009) argue that despite these improvements—reflected in the ability of 
institutions to borrow larger amounts over longer periods—state guarantees were unable 
to totally restore the euro interbank market because liquidity and maturities did not reached 
pre-crisis levels (Schmitz, Weber, and Posch 2009, 67).  
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In assessing Austria’s bank support measures generally, the European Commission has 
concluded that “despite the significant costs, the use of bank support measures in line with 
EU State aid rules helped to restructure the Austrian banking sector and preserve financial 
stability” (European Commission 2016). 
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VI. Appendix A 
In Europe, the interbank market was hit particularly hard by the global financial crisis. 
Unsecured interbank loans were charged high premiums, market liquidity dried up, and 
maturity terms shrunk throughout late 2007 and early 2008 before the interbank market 
largely ceased functioning following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
(Schmidt, Weber, and Posch 2009, 66).  In Austria, financial institutions were affected by 
exposure to Lehman Brothers and Icelandic banks as well as by their activity in central and 
southeast European markets (Kalss 2010, 528).  
In response to these conditions, euro-area countries convened at a summit in October 2008. 
The meeting resulted in a joint action plan calling for national governments to “improve 
market functioning over longer term maturities” through the introduction of guarantee 
programs for bank senior debt issuance (Summit of the Euro Area Countries 2008). In 
Austria, this call was met by the passage of a financial market stability package that 
contained the Interbank Market Support Act (IBSG) and the Financial Market Stability Act 
(FinStaG).  
IBSG had two main components. First, it called for the establishment of a new, privately 
owned clearing bank to facilitate interbank lending. The bank, Oesterreichische 
Clearingbank AG (OeCAG) conducted regular auctions to match available deposits with 
demands for credit. OeCAG could issue securities guaranteed by the federal government, and 
the government pledged to cover a certain amount of the clearing bank’s losses. Second, it 
allowed the government to guarantee securities with maturities of five years or less issued 
by other credit institutions. (See Simon 2020 for more information on the IBSG guarantee 
scheme.) FinStaG allowed the Federal Minister of Finance to recapitalize and strengthen the 
capital base of specific credit institutions and insurance companies. (See Simon 2018 for 
more information on the FinStaG.) 
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